

7 AUG 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: NIO/USIB Interface

1. Your decision to establish NIOs will undoubtedly raise questions in the community concerning interface with USIB. Specifically, there will be a question of the relationship of the NIO concept to the earlier proposal on the USIB committee structure.

2. Basically, the NIO concept subsumes and voids key aspects of the USIB Committee restructure proposal. ICS has completely reviewed the USIB committee proposal and revised the recommendations to accord with the NIO concept. Our review took into account the proposed changes to the NIOs in your memorandum to USIB and the USIB substantive objectives paper (key intelligence questions) which you approved in principle. It was our intent to retain the valuable aspects of community coordination in the current USIB structure while reinforcing USIB's ability to deal with a new emphasis on the prime function of establishing requirements and priorities for its collective production and collection resources.

3. Primary committees. Nine committees should be formed corresponding to the NIOs proposed, with the NIO as chairman. The NIO, plus representatives of the primary producing agencies--CIA, DIA and INR--should form the basic committee membership with additional membership appropriate to subject matter at the option of the NIO. A tenth primary committee should be a Security Committee with a representative from each USIB agency chaired by a DCI representative. (As in the case of NIOs, the chairman should have this function as his sole duty.)

4. These committees would respond to NSCIC and DCI guidance in the production of estimates (NIEs, NIAMS, and NSSM inputs). The NIO would utilize the committee to assign responsibilities to USIB members for inputs and oversee the coordination of products and reports. The committees would also respond to key intelligence questions (KIQs) levied by NSCIC and DCI, evaluating USIB application of production,

processing and collection resources against substantive problems. Overall, however, the most important function of these committees would be to make periodic reports, perhaps quarterly, on the effectiveness and sufficiency of resources applied to intelligence problems in their areas of responsibility. The Security Committee would respond to DCI and USIB on matters of protection of methods, foreign releases, compartmentation, and those matters previously handled by TSCC.

5. USIB Support Groups. The functions of the current collection system oriented USIB committees (COMIREX, SIGINT Committee, and Human Sources Committee) would be retained. However, the functions of these committees is fundamentally different from those of the primary committees. Under the proposed NIO/USIB committee concept, the functions of the collection system oriented committees would be supportive of the primary committees. The support would be essentially in the area of advice on collection strategies, in consolidation of requirements and priorities by collection system, and on specific security problems. The day-to-day interface with collection system managers (NSA, etc.) would not change appreciably. As a result of these differences, we propose that the current committees be renamed as support groups, i.e., IREX Support Group, SIGINT Support Group and Human Sources Support Group. The latter would subsume the functions of the IPC and the DRC as subelements of the human resources management function.

6. We propose one additional support group to provide foreign scientific and technical support to the primary committees--the Foreign S&T Support Group. This group would subsume the functions of GMAIC, JAEIC and SIC. It would respond primarily to the needs of the Strategic Weapons/SALT NIO, but to the other NIOs as well. (In the case of JAEIC, a minor change to an NSCID would be required.)

7. The USIB Support Groups can be organized in two fundamentally different ways: they can be headed up by "sole-duty" DCI representatives similar to NIOs with staff provided by the USIB members and the O/DCI, or they can be made functions of appropriate Agency offices. In the latter case, COMIREX can be administered and operated by DDI, SIGINT Committee by NSA, Human Sources by DDO, and Foreign Science and Technology by DDS&T or OSI.

8. A choice need not be made soon with regard to COMIREX and the SIGINT Committees. Their names can be changed and their relationships to the primary committees clarified, leaving matters of chairmanship, manning responsibility and reporting chain for future decision. The merging of the various human resource committees into one Support Group with a DDO chairman and the merging of the technical committees under a DDS&T chairman can also be accomplished without further decision at this time.

9. Other Committees. The above actions (or options) can be adopted without specific disposition of other current USIB Committees. If the general concept is adopted, the disposition of other committees can be worked out in detail so as to retain useful features of the current structure. In that light, the following suggestions are less recommendations than observations:

a. Economic Intelligence Committee: The functions of this committee are absorbed in the NIO structure.

b. Watch Committee: The eventual disposition of this committee will be contingent upon the results of ongoing actions to improve warning and crisis reporting systems.

c. NIS Committee: In light of recent disestablishment of the NIS program by USIB, this committee can be terminated.

d. Intelligence Information Handling Committee: The function of this committee requires such close coordination with DCI/IC that its permanent staff could be transferred to ICS. However, USIB member representation should continue.

e. Critical Collection Problems Committee: Since the primary NIO/USIB committees will examine collection problems in their areas of responsibility, there will be no further need for a separate CCPC.

10. If the above expansion on your NIO concept is acceptable to you, I recommend that a follow-up memorandum to USIB be forwarded soon, as it could have considerable impact on responses to your invitation of nominations for NIOs.

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R.S. We have reviewed your comment on an earlier paper on this subject which we rec'd today. I like this scheme in consonance with your view. We agree that NIO's shall not become in house producers of NIE's etc. see PP 4.

Lew Allen, Jr.
Major General, USAF
Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence
Community Staff

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TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	(DDMBS) Members, CIA Management		
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CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE	
Remarks:			
<p>Attached is a more fully developed outline of a National Intelligence Office. It is built on Mr. Colby's key concepts -- and designed, as well, to cope with what is sure to be a heavy and challenging work load.</p> <p>MCA - 44B</p>			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
Ramsey Forbush, Acting D/NE			10 Jul 73
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FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICE

Will be reorganized

1. The National Intelligence Office is established as an independent office reporting to the Director of Central Intelligence. It will replace the Office and Board of National Estimates, SAVA, and possibly other selected units.

2. The National Intelligence Office will be made up as follows:

a. There will be some 14 or 15 National Intelligence Officers (NIOs). At least some of these individuals will be on non-permanent assignment; their tours of duty will be staggered, as the Director shall determine, so that each year there will be some turnover. Most of the NIOs will specialize in particular geographical areas or functional subjects of major importance. A few will be generalists, focusing their efforts on projects which cut across various geographic/functional spheres; on special projects laid on by the Director or outside requests accepted by him; on assisting other NIOs in carrying through the time-consuming tasks of

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production and coordination; and on supervising certain office-wide activities (e.g., consultants' meetings, liaison with foreign intelligence services). The NIOs will be the Director's personal representatives and will report directly to him on their specialized subjects and on all assigned projects. In dealings with USIB member agencies, they will work through normal command channels. They will be responsible for assuring the production of the coordinated products of the Intelligence Community -- NIEs, NIAMs, NSSM responses, DCI briefings (NSC, WASAG, Congress), etc. In the production of coordinated National Intelligence, the NIOs shall use the National Intelligence Office's own substantive/support staff, task the appropriate agencies and elements of the Community for inputs, arrange for panels of experts as may be required, and oversee the process of coordination. The NIOs will assist the Director in identifying customer needs for National Intelligence, uncertainties requiring additional intelligence collection or analysis, and national policy problems on which National Intelligence might offer assistance. They will maintain close contact with the NSC Staff and other principal intelligence consumers and will, as

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appropriate, serve as the Director's representatives at NSSM and ad hoc policy support meetings. The NIOs will be charged with presenting for the Director's review, products that are fully objective and take account of alternative views and interpretations that may obtain in different parts of the Community.

b. Each NIO will be provided with necessary secretarial assistance, but only those concerned with the most active portfolios will have staff assistants of their own.

c. The substantive/support staff, serving the office as a whole, will assist the NIOs in developing substantive judgments, in levying requirements, and in drafting, editing, coordination, and producing National Intelligence. This staff, in addition to a substantive complement, will include elements providing central editorial standards and reproduction-and-printing arrangements. To the degree feasible, members of the new staff will be drawn from the present staff of the Office of National Estimates so as to ensure that existing expertise and drafting/estimating skills are not lost. Those members of the new staff who are in the professional grade

levels will be regionally or functionally specialized; each will work primarily under the direction of the NIO in that particular specialty, but will also be available to aid on other projects (e.g., those which cut across a number of geographic/functional spheres). In addition to career ONI staff professionals, the office may utilize professionals seconded on a rotating basis from other components of CIA and other parts of the Intelligence Community.

d. One National Intelligence Officer will be named Director of the National Intelligence Office to exercise administrative authority within the National Intelligence Office and provide direction to the substantive/support staff. He will also chair meetings of National Intelligence Officers for discussion of production planning, work schedules, quality control, and consumer feedback. He will promote cooperative working patterns among the NIOs, encouraging joint projects, constructive criticism of the drafts of others, and cross-fertilization of ideas. A second NIO will be named to act as Director, NIO, in the D/NIO's absence.

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3. National Intelligence Officers (tentative):

USSR and Satellites

Europe and NATO

China, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan

Southeast Asia

Middle East and South Asia

Latin America and Black Africa

International Trade and Finance

World Energy (especially oil)

* Strategic Weapons and SALT

General Purpose Forces and MBFR

Four or five Generalists, one of whom will serve as D/NIO

(The Generalists will perform the kinds of services indicated in paragraph 2.a. They will, among other things, organize the production of National Intelligence on such topics as East-West and Sino-Soviet relations, subversion and terrorism, radicalism and nationalism, and drug traffic and international crime.)

4. Certain of the tentative positions indicated in paragraph 3 will be identified as open to nomination of candidates by the USIB Members, either from their own agencies or from elsewhere. The remainder will be filled, at least in the first instance, by CIA people. The selections will be made by the Director of Central Intelligence according to his concept of the attributes required and according to individual qualifications. Any individuals selected from outside CIA will serve on reimbursable detail.

5. A Memorandum for USIB will be prepared at a later date, describing the new Office of National Intelligence, explaining its purposes and functions, and calling upon the heads of the various agencies to make nominations to the identified NIO positions.

ILLEGIB

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Members

SUBJECT : National Intelligence Officers

1. National Intelligence Officers will be appointed by the Director of Central Intelligence for such geographical areas or functional subjects as may be required from time to time. Each NIO will be the Director's personal representative and will report directly to him on his subject, but all direction will be issued through normal command channels to elements of USIB member agencies.

2. The primary function of an NIO will be to provide contact laterally on his subject across the functionally organized Intelligence Community and with customers and outside consultants as required. Each NIO will be responsible to the Director for providing Intelligence Community coordinated products (using such panels of experts and arranging USIB consideration as may be required) to satisfy requirements for NIE's, NSSM responses, DCI briefings (e.g., NSC, WSAG, Congress), etc. He will assist the Director in identifying customer needs for National Intelligence, uncertainties requiring collection guidance, analysis or production, and national policy problems on which National Intelligence might offer assistance. He will maintain close personal contact with NSC Staff and other principal intelligence consumers and contributors at the departmental level. The NIO will be charged with presenting for the Director's review fully objective presentations of alternate views and interpretations.

3. Each designated NIO will be assigned one or more assistants and secretarial aid as may be required from time to time to assist him in his substantive, coordinating and requirements duties and in drafting or editing when needed. These assistants will be assigned on an ad hoc or extended detail from USIB member agencies as required.

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4. One National Intelligence Officer will be assigned administrative authority for the National Intelligence Officers. He will chair meetings of National Intelligence Officers for discussion of production standards, work schedules, quality control and product review. He will be assisted by an Editorial Staff to provide central editorial standards, schedules and assistance for the National Intelligence Officers.

5. National Intelligence Officers (tentative):

USSR and Satellites

Europe and NATO

Northeast Asia

Southeast Asia

Arab World

Latin America

Economic Intelligence

Strategic Weapons (and SALT)

General Purpose Forces (and MBFR)

6. USIB members are invited to nominate candidates for the tentative positions in paragraph 5, from their agency or from other sources. Final selection will be made by the Director of Central Intelligence according to individual qualifications. Any individuals selected from outside CIA will serve on reimbursable detail.

7. The NIO's will replace the present Board and Office of National Estimates, the Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs, and other units as appropriate.

W. E. Colby

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